Framing effects of risk communication in health-related decision making. Learning from a discrete choice experiment by Nguyen, Florence et al.
Framing effects of risk communication in health-related
decision making. Learning from a discrete choice
experiment
Florence Nguyen, Marie-Odile Carre`re, Nora Moumjid
To cite this version:
Florence Nguyen, Marie-Odile Carre`re, Nora Moumjid. Framing effects of risk communication
in health-related decision making. Learning from a discrete choice experiment. Working Paper
GATE 2009-21. 2009. <halshs-00435090>
HAL Id: halshs-00435090
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00435090
Submitted on 23 Nov 2009
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DOCUMENTS DE TRAVAIL - WORKING PAPERS 
 
W.P. 09-21 
  
Framing effects of risk communication in health-related 
decision making. Learning from a discrete  
choice experiment 
 
 
Florence Nguyen, Marie-Odile Carrère, Nora Moumjid 
 
 
Novembre 2009 
 
GATE Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Économique 
UMR 5824 du CNRS 
93 chemin des Mouilles – 69130 Écully – France 
B.P. 167 – 69131 Écully Cedex 
Tél. +33 (0)4 72 86 60 60 – Fax +33 (0)4 72 86 60 90 
Messagerie électronique gate@gate.cnrs.fr 
Serveur Web : www.gate.cnrs.fr 
 
 
GATE 
Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie 
Économique 
UMR 5824 du CNRS 
 
 1 
 
Titre de l’article 
Framing effects of risk communication in health-related decision making. Learning from a discrete 
choice experiment 
 
Nom des auteurs: 
Florence Nguyen 1, Marie-Odile Carrère 1, Nora Moumjid 1 
1GATE (Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Economique), UMR 5824 – CNRS ; Université Lyon1 ; 
Université Lyon2 ; ENS LSH ; Centre Léon Bérard, Lyon, France  
 
Adresse complète de l’auteur 
Florence NGUYEN 
GRESAC- Centre Léon Bérard 
28 rue Laënnec  
69008 Lyon France 
Email: florence_thi_nguyen@hotmail.com 
Fax: (00 33) 4 78 78 28 04 
Tel: (00 33) 4 78 78 27 80 
 
 
 
 2 
Abstract 
Background How to communicate uncertainty is a major concern in medicine and in health 
economics. We aimed at studying the framing effects of risk communication on stated preferences in 
a discrete choice experiment (DCE) performed to elicit women’s preferences for Hormone 
Replacement Therapy. Methods Two versions of the questionnaire were randomly administered to 
respondents. Multiple risks were expressed as natural frequencies using either a constant reference 
class (Design 1) or variable reference classes (Design 2). We first tested whether Design 1 would 
impose a lower cognitive burden than Design 2. We then examined whether the two designs resulted 
in different utility model estimates. Results Design 1 improved consistency (monotonicity and 
stability). However, rates of dominance or intransitive responses did not differ across designs. Design 
1 decreased women’s sensitivity to the risk of fractures and increased their sensitivity to the risk of 
breast cancer as compared to all other attributes. Discussion Framing effects of risk communication 
on stated preferences may be a major problem in the design of DCEs. More research is needed to 
determine whether our findings are replicable and to further investigate the normative question of how 
to improve risk communication in health-related decision-making. 
 
Keywords: Framing effects, Risk communication, Discrete choice experiment  
Classification JEL: C12; I19; D83 
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1. Introduction 
Thirty years ago, Tversky and Kahnemann stated that the psychological principles that govern the 
perception of decision problems produce predictable shifts of preference when the same problem is 
framed in different ways (Tversky and Kahnemann, 1981). They also specified that “the frame that a 
decision maker adopts is controlled partly by the formulation of the problem and partly by the norms, 
habits and personal characteristics of the decision maker”. Thus, variations in these factors may result 
in different decisions on the same problem, a phenomenon which is referred to as the framing effect. 
Since then, framing effects have drawn considerable attention in various academic fields such as 
psychology, economics, sociology and neurosciences, and have been tested in quite different areas of 
human decision making such as management, finance, environment, law and medicine. A 
considerable amount of theoretical and empirical literature has explored the impact of framing effects 
on decision under uncertainty, knowing that uncertainty is a major component of most decision 
problems. Framing effects, either extrinsic or intrinsic to individuals, challenge their ability to make 
accurate decisions when they are faced with a decision problem under uncertainty. Considering the 
formulation of the problem, framing effects raise the essential normative question of how to 
communicate uncertainty so that a well informed decision can be made.  
 
In decision-making processes involving peoples’ health, the framing effects of communication of 
uncertainty are particularly important to consider (Politi et al., 2007). Indeed, different formulations of 
the same uncertainty, which are logically equivalent, can lead to different decisions regarding life or 
death. Depending first on the available evidence, which can be very poor (British Medical Journal 
Clinical Evidence, 2007), uncertainty may be communicated in a number of different ways. Using 
verbal methods leads to highly variable interpretation (Mazur and Hickam, 1991; Bogardus et al., 
1999; Mazur and Merz, 1994). Quantitative information on risk (probabilities or likelihood) using for 
example absolute risks, relative risks or frequencies, allows for more precision. However, the framing 
effects of communicating relative risks compared to absolute risks have been shown to affect 
decisions since using relative risks emphasizes the perception of both benefits and risks (Edwards et 
al., 2002; Hux and Naylor, 1995; Forrow et al., 1992; Bucher et al., 1994).  
Regarding numeracy, i.e. the ability to understand quantitative information, Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 
(1995) have pointed out that it could be improved if the information format was adapted to the 
cognitive process. They have demonstrated that human Bayesian inference is better performed when 
risks are presented as natural frequencies rather than as standard probabilities (Gigerenzer and 
Hoffrage, 1995). Indeed, the proportion of correct responses strongly increases when natural 
frequencies are used instead of standard probabilities. Several experiments in medicine and law have 
confirmed these findings and the authors conclude that “statistics expressed as natural frequencies 
improve the statistical thinking of experts and non experts alike” (Hoffrage et al., 2000). 
 
It is worth noting that these marked advances in risk communication guidance were based on 
experiments where respondents’ answers could be compared with a right answer. However, in most 
choice situations, there is by definition no right or wrong answer, since choice is supposed to result 
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from the individual’s preferences. In that case, there is a lack of evidence about the best way to 
communicate risk information, which is all the more true when information is complex. For example, in 
many cases, multiple risks and benefits must be considered simultaneously. Risk information can then 
exceed the cognitive capacity of decision makers who may, in turn, use heuristics and other 
simplifying strategies (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) or behave according to ambiguity aversion 
(Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986). All these strategies may result in biased decisions.  
 
If the question of how to communicate uncertainty is a major concern in medicine, it is also of major 
importance in health economics, where eliciting the preferences of economic agents who make health-
related decisions under uncertainty is a key issue. However, the impact of uncertainty communication 
on stated preferences has received little attention. Regarding the contingent valuation method, we 
have identified only one published study in which willingness to pay for a longevity benefit has been 
found sensitive to the framing of the benefit, either as a gain in life expectancy or a reduction in annual 
mortality risk (Morris and Hammitt, 2001). Overall, the life expectancy format performs better than the 
risk reduction format regarding the validity of contingent valuation.  
Considering the discrete choice experiment (DCE) method, we have also identified only one very 
recent study testing the effects of different frames of information about risk in colorectal cancer 
screening (Howard and Salkeld, 2008). Risk attributes were framed either as gains or losses (e.g. 
cancers found versus cancers missed). The authors conclude that framing of attributes significantly 
influences the estimation of willingness to pay and marginal rates of substitution between attributes. 
However, no guidance on risk communication is given. Instead, the authors emphasize that we are at 
a very early stage of examining framing effects in health-related DCE and firmly encourage further 
research on this issue. 
 
We aimed at studying the framing effects of risk communication in a health-related DCE. We intended 
not only to determine whether framing effects are at work, but also to test the impacts of different risk 
presentations on preference properties, in order to provide some guidance for risk communication in 
health-related decision making.  
 
2. Methods 
The DCE was carried out to analyse women’s preferences for Hormone Replacement Therapy (HRT) 
- a treatment used by 20 to 30% French post-menopausal women (Allemand et al., 2008). HRT 
alleviates menopausal symptoms such as climacteric troubles, and decreases the risk of fractures 
due to osteoporosis. However, it is also associated with negative effects, such as an increased risk of 
developing breast cancer. Besides, HRT may also entail a monetary cost for users, since some 
treatments are covered by the public health insurance system and others are not. Those 
characteristics may lead women to make trade-offs and influence their attitude towards treatment.  
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2.1 Choice experiment design  
In order to establish which characteristics of HRT are important to women, we first searched the 
medical literature (WHI (Rossouw et al., 2002), MWS (Beral et al., 2003) and E3N (Fournier et al., 
2005) studies), then we organized three meetings with a panel of medical experts (three 
gynaecologists, 1 rheumatologist and 1 cardiologist). Finally, we organized a focus group interview 
with post-menopausal women, of whom some had already taken HRT and some had not.  
Seven attributes were selected, six related to health and one to cost. In order to reduce respondents’ 
cognitive burden, we decided to assign only two levels to each attribute (Table I). For each of the 6 
health risks, the two levels corresponded to the situation of post-menopausal French women with or 
without treatment. More precisely, the levels of risk of climacteric troubles were derived from reports 
by Grady (2003) and by the French Association for the Study of Menopause (AFEM). The levels of 
other health risks were derived from a report by the French Agency for the Safety of Health Products 
(AFSSAPS, 2004). The two cost levels were chosen as either 0, corresponding to no treatment, or the 
mean total cost of treatment in France whoever the payer is. 
 
Table I 
 
Hypothetical scenarios were created by combining attribute levels. There were 128 possible 
scenarios (27). We developed a level balanced, orthogonal main effect fractional factorial design of 8 
scenarios (Zwerina et al., 1996). Applying the rules of minimal overlap and utility balance, we created 
eight choice sets by pairing each initial scenario with its exact opposite, i.e. the one which differed in 
all attribute levels. 
 
In order to test for a framing effect of risk communication, two different versions of the survey 
instrument were developed, then randomly administered to respondents. In the two versions, the 6 
health risks were expressed using natural frequencies, according to previously mentioned guidance 
(Hoffrage et al., 2000). However, the two versions differed in the choice of reference classes. In the 
first version (referred to as « Design 1 »), natural frequencies were expressed using a constant 
reference class. We chose a 100 000 people reference class because (i) two of the 6 health risks 
involved cancer (breast and colorectal) and (ii) cancer incidence is usually expressed per 100 000 
population (International Agency for Research on Cancer, 2008). The second version (referred to as 
« Design 2 ») slightly differed from the first one: risks were also expressed in natural frequencies but 
the reference class could vary from one attribute to another. Reference population sizes were still 
expressed as powers of ten but as small as possible, so that numbers of cases were still expressed 
as whole numbers. As a consequence, natural frequencies referred to 10, 1 000 or 10 000 people. 
An example of a choice set as presented with both DCE designs is given in Table II. 
 
Table II 
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2.2 Survey 
The survey was conducted in December, 2006 and January, 2007. Participants randomly selected 
from the list of telephone subscribers in the Lyon area, France, were recruited by phone. Women who 
accepted to participate were sent a questionnaire and a prepaid return envelope, and were asked to 
return their questionnaire once it had been completed. 
Of the 669 women who were sent a questionnaire, 470 returned it (70% response rate). After 
exclusion of 8 respondents with large amounts of missing data, 462 subjects were finally used in the 
analysis. 
Subjects randomly received one of the two versions of the questionnaire: 229 completed the constant 
reference class survey instrument (Design 1) and 233 completed the variable reference class survey 
instrument (Design 2). Considering menopausal status, marital status, education, household income, 
professional or extraprofessional activities and complementary health insurance, Chi-square analyses 
did not detect any significant differences between respondents of the two groups. 
Each respondent was presented the eight choice sets of the two scenarios and was asked which 
scenario she preferred in each choice set. 
 
2.3 Model estimation 
The statistical analysis in our DCE consisted in estimating a preference model by comparing two 
utility functions. Individual utility function is not directly observable and has to be estimated indirectly 
by analysing the respondents’ choices. 
McFadden’s Random Utility Theory (McFadden, 1974) states that the utility of individual i for scenario 
r consists of an observable systematic component (Vir) and an unobservable random component (εir). 
, (1) 
The observable utility depends on the utility associated with each attribute. Assuming a linear and 
additive utility function, we obtain: 
 (2) 
where Xr  is a vector of the levels of m HRT attributes in scenario r. Thus: 
  (3) 
Due to the random component, the utility function is probabilistic. The statistical model is based on 
the probability that individual i chooses scenario A rather than scenario B if: 
PAi= Prob (UAi > UBi ) (4) 
Leading to PAi( ) (5) 
Assuming a normal distribution of the random component, the calculation of the probability that 
individual i will choose scenario A is based on a probit specification: 
  (6) 
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where f(.) represents the density function and Ф(.) the standardised normal distribution. The scale 
parameter, σ, is usually set to 1. Nevertheless, when observations are obtained from two different 
survey instruments as was the case here, possible differences in scale parameters between the two 
data sets have to be taken into account (cf. infra). 
 
As each woman was presented with eight choice sets, a random effects probit model was applied in 
order to account for the individual-specific variation, αi: 
 (7) 
This error term eliminates the correlation between εir and explanatory variables, and improves the 
efficiency of the estimates. 
 
2.4 Hypotheses and methods 
We wanted to determine whether two slightly different ways of communicating risk information 
through DCE could result in differences in preference properties on the one hand and in preference 
structure on the other hand. Thus, we used a two-step approach as done by Maddala et al. when 
comparing DCE designs which differed in overlap of attribute levels (Maddala et al., 2003). 
First, we tested the overall hypothesis that the constant reference class survey instrument (Design 1) 
would impose a lower cognitive burden on respondents than the variable reference class survey 
instrument (Design 2). This hypothesis was suggested by Gigerenzer and Edwards who stated that 
“[…] the ultimate source of confusion is the reference class […]”, specifying that “conditional 
probabilities such as sensitivity and specificity refer to different classes […], which makes their mental 
combination difficult” (Gigerenzer and Edwards, 2003). We first compared response consistency (i.e. 
monotonicity and stability), dominance and transitivity across the two survey groups. Second, we 
examined whether the two different risk presentations resulted in significantly different utility model 
estimates, which would confirm the hypothesis that risk communication yields framing effects.  
Our hypotheses and the methods used to test them are summarized in Table III and detailed 
hereafter. 
 
Table III 
 
As said before, the first group of hypotheses relates to whether the constant reference class survey 
instrument would impose a lower cognitive burden than the variable reference class survey 
instrument. 
Hypothesis 1a: The constant reference class survey instrument results in more consistency 
Besides the eight choice sets created to elicit women’s preferences, another choice set was added in 
which scenario A dominated scenario B with better values on 3 attributes (climacteric risk, breast 
cancer risk, cost) without any difference on the other 4 attributes. Monotonicity was violated when 
women chose scenario B rather than scenario A. 
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In order to test stability, one of the eight initial choice sets was repeated at the end of the 
questionnaire. Stability was violated when women did not give the same answer to the two same 
questions. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: The constant reference class survey instrument results in fewer dominant 
responses  
Assuming that questionnaire complexity could be one of the reasons for dominant preferences (Scott 
2002), we tested for differences in this property between the two designs. Respondents were asked 
whether they had taken into account one or several HRT attributes when making their choices. We 
considered responses as dominant when women who claimed they had taken only one attribute into 
account had actually always chosen the scenario in which this attribute reached its best level. 
 
Hypothesis 1c: The constant reference class survey instrument results in fewer intransitive 
responses  
As was the case for dominance, we assumed that questionnaire complexity could yield intransitive 
responses. Transitivity was assessed by creating a choice set based on one of the eight initial choice 
sets, with scenario A remaining the same but the new scenario B being dominated by the initial one. 
Thus, women choosing scenario A in the initial choice set were again expected to choose scenario A 
in the new choice set. 
 
 
The second group of hypotheses relates to whether the two different risk presentations resulted in 
significantly different utility model estimates. We decided to test these hypotheses among women 
whom responses did not violate consistency, non-dominance and transitivity. Indeed, one may 
reasonably assume that inconsistent responses may result from limitation in cognitive capacities, then 
that they may not reflect respondents’ preferences. The question is more complex regarding 
dominance and intransitivity, which can reflect either limitation in cognitive capacities or real 
preferences. However, we excluded the corresponding answers because, even when they do reflect 
preferences, they cannot be modelled using a utility function since this requires both non dominance 
and transitivity. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: The overall vector of choice parameters differs across the two survey 
instruments  
Two separate random parameter probit models were estimated for the two survey instruments. Using 
a likelihood ratio (LR) test we tested the hypothesis of equal overall vectors of parameters in the two 
designs, using either constant or variable reference classes. However, pooling the two datasets was 
problematical as the estimated parameters were confounded with the corresponding scale 
parameters (σ in Eq.6). That is why we adjusted for a possible difference in scales between the 
datasets using the Swait and Louvière procedure (Swait and Louvière, 1993). It consisted in setting 
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the scale of the dataset in Design 1, σ1, to 1 and searching for the scale of the dataset in Design 2, 
σ2, which would maximise the log-likelihood function of the scaled-pooled model. 
A first LR test compared the two separate models and the scaled-pooled model to test the hypothesis 
of equal overall vectors of parameters in the two datasets. Rejection of this hypothesis would indicate 
significant differences in preferences between the two survey designs. In case of non rejection of the 
hypothesis, a further likelihood ratio between the scaled-pooled and the simple pooled model would 
be required to test the hypothesis of equality between the scale parameters σ1 and σ2, in the two 
datasets. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Some choice parameters vary depending on the survey instrument, while 
others do not 
First, estimated parameters could have statistical significance in one of the two separate models and 
not in the other. Second, in case of difference in the scale parameters, significant coefficients of the 
two estimated models cannot be compared directly. So we compared marginal rates of substitution 
(MRS). Since MRS are expressed as the ratios of two coefficients (when significantly different from 
zero) they do not depend on scale parameters.  MRS variances were estimated using the Delta 
method (Greene, 2003). Possible MRS differences between the two survey designs were tested using 
the Student t-test. 
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3. Results 
Statistically significant differences in consistency were observed between the two survey groups 
(Table IV). More precisely, rates of non-monotonic and unstable preferences were both higher in the 
variable reference class survey group (Design 2) than in the constant one (Design 1). Proportions 
were respectively 6.9% (n=16) versus 2.1% (n=5) for non-monotonicity (p=0.0157, Chi-sq test), and 
14.6% (n=34) versus 9.1% (n= 21) for instability (p=0.0720, Chi-sq test). 
 
We observed no statistically significant difference in dominance between the two survey groups 
(Table IV): 10% (n= 24) in Design 1 and 12% (n=27) in Design 2 (p=0.700, Chi-sq test).  
 
Table IV 
 
Transitivity was studied in the 219 women who had chosen scenario A in the initial choice set. No 
statistical difference was observed between the two survey groups, since the same number of women 
made intransitive choices (1.4%, n=3). 
 
As described above, women’s preferences were then modelled among the 338 women who did not 
exhibit inconsistent, dominant or intransitive preferences, of whom 176 had completed the Design 1 
questionnaire and 153 the Design 2 questionnaire. 
 
Table V presents the results of separate probit models for each of the two experimental designs, i.e. 
the estimated choice parameters in the utility function. Of note, risks had been previously recoded so 
that they were expressed in the same units in the two data groups. Most of the parameters were 
significant, except for the risk of fractures in Design 1. As expected, all significant parameters were 
negative, since attributes were expressed as either risks or costs.  
 
Table V 
 
By setting σ1 to 1 and maximizing the log-likelihood function of the scaled pooled model, we 
estimated the scale parameter σ2 to be 0.95.  
Using a likelihood-ratio test, we compared each separate model with a scaled pooling of the two 
datasets (Table VI). The Swait-Louviere (Swait and Louviere, 1993) likelihood ratio test statistic was 
LR= 2[-3809.77-(-1995.02 + -1816.23)] = 2.96. Knowing that the critical value of the chi-square 
distribution is 14.06 at the 0.05 significance level on 11 degrees of freedom, the hypothesis that the 
overall vectors of attribute parameters were equal across the two data sets was not rejected.  
 
To test whether the scale parameters were significantly different across data sets we performed a 
further likelihood ratio test comparing the scaled pooled and the simple pooled models (Table VI). In 
the simple pooled model, the relative scale parameter was no longer allowed to differ across data 
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sets. The likelihood-ratio statistic for this test was LR= -2[-3811.25-(-3809.77)] = 2.96. Knowing that 
the critical value at the 0.05 significance level is 2.70, this result approaches statistical significance. 
However, the hypothesis that the scale parameters do not differ across the two datasets could not be 
rejected.  
 
 
Table VI 
Whilst the above results indicate no significant difference in the overall vectors of choice parameters 
across designs, some choice parameters or MRS did vary, while others did not. First, the risk of 
fractures had no statistically significant weight in Design 1 whereas it had in Design 2 (Table V). 
Then, MRS estimates were derived from the two separate models for all combinations of 2 of the 7 
attributes, except when the risk of fractures was involved in Design 1 (Table VII). As a result, 15 MRS, 
could be compared across the two models referring to the 6 remaining attributes.  
 
Five MRS were found significantly different. Hence, preference structures resulting from the two 
designs were different and these differences were not induced by possible scaling effects. All 5 MRS 
involved the risk of breast cancer. It seems that Design 1 made women even more sensitive to this 
risk than to the other attributes, either other health risks or cost.  
To achieve a given reduction in the risk of breast cancer, women were willing to accept an increase in 
all other health risks, and this increase was higher when preferences were elicited using Design 1 
rather than Design 2: 1.63 higher for climacteric troubles (10.063/6.149), 2.66 for colorectal cancer 
(0.568/0.213), 1.81 for thromboembolism (0.886/0.488) and 2.06 for cardiac risk (1.857/0.901).  
As far as cost was concerned, women were willing to pay 1.72 times more for a given breast cancer 
risk reduction when presented with Design 1 rather than Design 2 (0.398/0.231).  
 
While risk communication impacted women’s preferences through the risk of fractures according to 
the significance of choice parameter and through the risk of breast cancer according to the related 
MRS, it did not seem to have any influence on MRS between the other 5 attributes, i.e. risks of 
climacteric troubles, colorectal cancer, thromboembolism or cardiovascular disease, and cost.  
 
Table VII 
 
4. Discussion 
Our study aimed at analysing the possible framing effects of risk communication in a health-related 
DCE. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of two questionnaires which only differed in the 
way how information on risk was provided.  
 
We first hypothesized that expressing multiple risks using a constant reference class rather than 
variable reference classes would impose a lower cognitive burden on respondents. This hypothesis 
was partly confirmed. An important finding was that preference consistency significantly improved 
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when risks were presented using a constant reference class. Indeed, the monotonicity test exhibited 
2.1% of non-monotonic preferences when the constant reference class design was used, a proportion 
which increased to 6.9% with the other design. Moreover, according to the stability test, the constant 
reference class risk presentation generated 9.1% of unstable preferences, whereas this rate increased 
to 14.6% when variable reference classes were used.  
The pattern of intransitive preferences was not statistically different across survey designs. Rates were 
very low (1.4%), which can be due to the transitivity test used which compared two choice sets only. 
Considering the test of dominant preferences, the corresponding rates were about 10% of 
respondents and they did not differ across designs. As stated by Scott (2002), dominant preferences 
can have various explanations such as the complexity of the choice task and the use of heuristics in 
the choice process. But they can also reflect real strong preferences. It was beyond the scope of this 
study to analyze the reasons for dominant preferences. However, dominant preferences deserve 
specific analysis given that, as they result in non compensatory decision making, they should not be 
modeled using a multiattribute utility function.  
 
Considering our hypothesis that the two survey instruments would result in different utility model 
estimates, it is worth noting that this hypothesis was not tested on the whole sample. Indeed, women 
whose responses violated consistency (i.e. monotonicity and stability), non-dominance and transitivity 
had to be excluded from the utility function modelling. First, one may reasonably assume that 
inconsistent responses may result from limitation in cognitive capacities, then that they may not 
accurately reflect respondents’ preferences. Second, regarding dominance and intransitivity, and 
whatever the explanations given, corresponding preferences cannot be modelled using a utility 
function since this would require both non dominance and transitivity. 
 
Our findings confirm that preferences structure depends on the presentation of risk. More precisely, 
the attribute level utility weights resulting from the two risk presentations did not exhibit significantly 
different scale parameters at the 0.05 level, which means that the amount of unexplained response 
variability was the same across the two designs. However, while the overall vectors of choice 
parameters were not significantly different, significant differences in some choice parameters and/or 
MRS were observed across designs. Two major changes occurred when risks were presented using a 
constant reference class instead of variable reference classes. On the one hand, women were no 
more sensitive to the risk of fractures. On the other hand, women’s sensitivity to breast cancer risk 
increased. More precisely, all MRS involving breast cancer risk changed towards a significantly 
greater sensitivity to this risk. The front page of the questionnaire presented all possible effects of 
HRT, either positive such as a decreased risk of fractures, or negative such as an increased risk of 
breast cancer. According to Fischoff et al. (1978), judgments of risk and benefit are negatively 
correlated, i.e. the greater the perceived benefit, the lower the perceived risk and vice versa. As 
highlighted by Slovic et al. (2003), “this negative relationship […] occurs even when the nature of the 
gains or benefits from an activity is distinct, and qualitatively different, from the nature of the risks”. Our 
own findings suggest that, since the constant reference class design improved response consistency, 
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the preferences elicited accordingly better conformed to the expected negative relationship. Indeed, 
the perception of an increase in breast cancer risk, a negative effect of HRT, increased while the 
perception of a decrease in the risk of fractures, a positive effect of HRT, decreased or even 
disappeared. 
 
Let us now consider the increased sensitivity to breast cancer risk in more details. In their study of 
people’s perception of the frequency of lethal events, Lichtenstein et al. (1978) have shown that 
cancer, due to sensationalization, is one of the most overestimated causes of death, as opposed to 
“undramatic, quiet killers” such as stroke and heart disease. Indeed, breast cancer has been greatly 
sensationalized in France over the past three years, due to a national information campaign for breast 
cancer screening. As a consequence, since the constant reference class design improves response 
consistency, preferences elicited accordingly better conform to the expected strong sensitivity to 
breast cancer risk.  
Considering MRS between health risks, women would accept a higher increase in all other health 
risks in return for a given reduction in breast cancer risk when preferences are elicited using constant 
reference than when using the other design. While this is obviously true for the risk of fractures to 
which women are no more sensitive, this is also the case for all other health risks, for which the 
corresponding MRS are multiplied by a factor ranging from 1.63 to 2.66.  
As far as cost is concerned, women would be willing to pay 1.72 times more for a given breast cancer 
risk reduction when preferences are elicited using the constant reference class risk presentation 
rather than the other design. Importantly, this finding means that a slight change in risk 
communication may yield a major change in willingness to pay. 
 
Our results demonstrate that the framing effects of risk communication on stated preferences may be 
a major problem in the design of DCEs. As mentioned, we have identified only one recent report of 
framing effects of risk communication in a DCE on colorectal cancer screening (Howard and Salkeld, 
2008). Risk attributes were presented either as gains or losses but no guidance regarding the best 
way to proceed was provided. However, other framing effects have been demonstrated in DCE 
studies. Various levels of overlap of attributes have been compared (Maddala et al., 2003) and a 
possible ordering effect of the price attribute has been tested (Kjaer et al., 2006).  
 
Analyzing framing effects is not an easy task. But answering the essential normative question of how 
to overcome framing problems is even more difficult. In the presence of multiple risks, as was the case 
in our study, our findings are in favor of a presentation using constant reference parameters, given 
that the stated preferences are more consistent, thus confirming the suggestion made by others 
regarding risk communication in medicine (Gigerenzer and Edwards, 2003; International Patient 
Decision Aid Standards Collaboration, 2008). 
However, more research is needed to determine whether these findings are replicable and, more 
generally, to investigate the normative question of how to improve risk communication in health-
related decision-making.  
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Tables 
Table I Attributes and levels used in the study 
Attributes Levels 
Risk of climacteric troubles a  20 000, 70 000  
Risk of fractures b  400, 600  
Risk of colorectal cancer b  40, 60  
Risk of breast cancer b 250, 350  
Risk of thromboembolism b 150, 350  
Risk of cardiovascular disease b 150, 200  
Cost c 0, 250 
a per 100 000 
b per 100 000 per year 
c € per year 
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Table II Example of a choice set as presented with both DCE designs 
 
 
 Design 1 
a Scenario A Scenario B 
Risk of climacteric troubles  70 000 per 100 000  20 000 per 100 000 
Risk of fractures  600 per100 000 per year 400 per 100 000 per year 
Risk of colorectal cancer  60 per 100 000 per year 40 per 100 000 per year 
Risk of breast cancer  250 per 100 000 per year 350 per 100 000 per year 
Risk of thromboembolism  150 per 100 000 per year 350 per 100 000 per year 
Risk of cardiovascular disease 200 per 100 000 per year 150 per 100 000 per year 
Cost 0€ per year 250€ per year 
Design 2 a Scenario A  Scenario B 
Risk of climacteric troubles  7 per 10  2 per 10  
Risk of fractures  6 per 1 000 per year 4 per 1 000 per year 
Risk of colorectal cancer  6 per 10 000 per year 4 per 10 000 per year 
Risk of breast cancer  25 per 10 000 per year 35 per 10 000 per year 
Risk of thromboembolism  15 per 10 000 per year 35 per 10 000 per year 
Risk of cardiovascular disease 20 per 10 000 per year 15 per 10 000 per year 
Cost 0 € per year 250€ per year 
a Risks are presented in natural frequencies, using a constant reference class in Design 1 and 
variable reference classes in Design 2. 
 
 20 
Table III. Hypotheses and associated methods 
Hypotheses Methods used 
1. The constant reference class survey instrument (Design 1) imposes a lower cognitive 
burden on respondents than the variable reference class survey instrument (Design 2) 
(a) Design 1 results in more consistency (a) Chi-sq test of the proportion of monotonicity 
and stability in each group 
(b) Design 1 results in fewer dominant 
responses 
(b) Chi-sq test of the proportion of dominant 
responses in each group 
(c) Design 1 results in fewer intransitive 
responses 
(c) Student test of the proportion of intransitive 
responses in each group 
2. The two survey instruments result in different utility model estimates 
(a) The overall vector of choice parameters 
differs across the two survey instruments  
(a) Estimation of 2 separate models for the 2 
survey instruments, and LR tests of separate 
and pooled, models (simple and scaled) 
(b) Some choice parameters vary depending on 
the survey instrument, while others do not  
(b) Comparison of choice parameters and 
marginal rates of substitution between attributes 
in the two survey instrument groups 
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Table IV. Tests for consistency and dominance differences between the two survey groups  
 
Hypothesis 1(a)
 
Hypothesis 1(b) 
 
 
Monotonicity
 
Stability 
 
Dominance 
 
Risk 
presentation 
Incorrect Correct Incorrect Correct Yes No 
Design 1 a 
n=229 
0.02 0.98 0.09 0.91 0.10 0.90 
Design 2 a 
n=233 
0.07 0.93 0.15 0.85 0.12 0.88 
Chi² 5.84 (p=0.0157) 3.24 (p=0.0720) 0.14 (p=0.700) 
a Risks are presented in natural frequencies, using a constant reference class in Design 1 and 
variable reference classes in Design 2.  
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Table V Probit estimates for each separate model 
 
Design 1 a 
 
Design 2 a 
 
Variable Coefficient P > | t | Coefficient P > | t | 
Intercept -0.180728 0.021 -0.127621 0.125 
Risk of climacteric troubles  -0.001133 0.000 -0.001193 0.000 
Risk of fractures  0.000040 0.923 -0.000976 0.037 
Risk of colorectal cancer  -0.020075 0.000 -0.034503 0.000 
Risk of breast cancer  -0.011396 0.000 -0.007334 0.000 
Risk of thromboembolism  -0.005559 0.000 -0.006497 0.000 
Risk of cardiovascular disease -0.010266 0.000 -0.013577 0.000 
Cost -0.002635 0.000 -0.002917 0.000 
     
Observations 1406 1280 
Respondents 176 162 
Log likelihood -1995.02 -1816.23 
a Risks are presented in natural frequencies, using a constant reference class in Design 1 and 
variable reference classes in Design 2.  
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Table VI Probit estimates for the pooled data sets  
 Scaled pooled model
 
Simple pooled model
 
Variable Coefficient P > | t | Coefficient P > | t | 
Intercept -0.163227 0.004 -0.166958 0.003 
Risk of climacteric troubles  -0.000011 0.000 -0.000012 0.000 
Risk of fractures  -0.000508 0.086 -0.000513 0.091 
Risk of colorectal cancer  -0.025723 0.000 -0.026130 0.000 
Risk of breast cancer  -0.009235 0.000 -0.009535 0.000 
Risk of thromboembolism  -0.005757 0.000 -0.005895 0.000 
Risk of cardiovascular disease -0.011464 0.000 -0.011722 0.000 
Cost -0.002635 0.000 -0.002702 0.000 
     
Observations 2686 2686 
Respondents 338 338 
Log likelihood -3809.77 -3811.25 
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Table VII Differences in marginal rates of substitution (MRS) a between the two designs b 
 
 
 
MRS 
Design 1 b 
 
Design 2 b 
 
Prob (MRS1-MRS2>0) 
Troubles, fractures -- c 0.818 -- 
Troubles, colorectal cancer 17.726 28.931 0.117 
Troubles, breast cancer 10.063 6.149 0.017 
Troubles, thromboembolism 4.909 5.448 0.302 
Troubles, cardiac risk 9.065 11.384 0.138 
Troubles, cost 2.327 2.446 0.419 
Fractures, colorectal cancer -- c 35.362 -- 
Fractures, breast cancer -- c 7.516 -- 
Fractures, thromboembolism -- c 6.659 -- 
Fractures, cardiac risk -- c 13.915 -- 
Fractures, cost -- c 2.990 -- 
Colorectal cancer, breast cancer 0.568 0.213 0.016 
Colorectal cancer, thromboembolism 0.277 0.188 0.147 
Colorectal cancer, cardiac risk 0.511 0.394 0.267 
Colorectal cancer, cost 0.131 0.085 0.172 
Breast cancer, thromboembolism 0.488 0.886 0.001 
Breast cancer, cardiac risk 0.901 1.857 0.001 
Breast cancer, cost 0.231 0.398 0.028 
Thromboembolism, cardiac risk 1.847 2.090 0.219 
Thromboembolism, cost 0.474 0.449 0.405 
Cardiac risk, cost 0.257 0.215 0.200 
a MRS of attribute x1 compared to attribute x2 is defined as the ratio of absolute compensating level 
variations with x1 as numerator and x2 as denominator. 
b  Risks are presented in natural frequencies, usi g a constant reference class in Design 1 and 
variable reference classes in Design 2. 
c MRS involving the risk of fractures are not presented since the corresponding parameter is not 
significantly different from zero in Design 1. 
